Tort of Trespass To California Realty

The California Court of Appeal clarified a tort claim for trespass to realty in the recent decision in Veiseh v. Stapp.

Generally, the tort of trespass protects possessory interests and, therefore, a person in actual possession of the land may sue for trespass. Ownership or recorded title to land is not required. Some California decisions state the plaintiff’s possession must be “lawful.” 

The Appellate Court in Veiseh addressed an issue of first impression about what constitutes “lawful possession.” 

Plaintiff Reza Veiseh transferred the real property in question to a custodian for the benefit of his minor daughter pursuant to the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (Prob. Code, §§ 3900–3925). The act requires the property to be held for the use and benefit of the minor. Veiseh did not comply with this requirement. 

Instead, he maintained possession and control of the real property for his own use and benefit, rather than the use and benefit of his daughter. The defendants argued Veiseh’s failure to comply with the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act meant his possession was unlawful. The trial court agreed. After a bench trial, the court found Veiseh’s actions were not consistent with the statute and he had no right of lawful possession in the real property. The court entered judgment for the defendants.

California case law establishes that “lawful possession” simply means actual, peaceful possession and a person with actual possession can sue for trespass even if he or she does not have any legal rights in the land. 

The Appellate Court concluded Veiseh’s failure to comply with California's Uniform Transfers to Minors Act did not render his possession of the real property unlawful for purposes of California's trespass law. 

The general definition of lawful possession applies in this case because, among other things, nothing in the text of the statute or the record supports the inference that the legislation was enacted to protect trespassers or otherwise define who could pursue a cause of action for trespass. The trial court’s explicit findings about Veiseh’s possession and control are sufficient to establish the lawful possession element of his trespass claim. 

The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 

In 2004, Veiseh acquired ownership of 20 acres of land in Kern County ("Parcel").  In 2008, Veiseh recorded a grant deed transferring the Parcel from himself to “Zohreh Afshar, as custodian for Hedyeh Veiseh, under the California Uniform Transfers to minors act.” 

Zohreh Afshar is Veiseh’s former wife and Hedyeh Veiseh is his daughter, who was a minor when the deed was recorded. At trial, Veiseh testified he and his former wife maintained good relations and were living in the same house where he had a separate room. 

He also testified he transferred the Parcel to the custodian and his minor daughter for estate planning reasons because, at the time, he was not feeling well and a couple of his friends had passed away. 

Veiseh alleged that later in 2008, cattle from adjoining land entered the Parcel and damaged the trees, vegetables and flowers he had planted and maintained on the Parcel. The defendants owned either the cattle or owned or leased the land from which the cattle entered the Parcel. 

Sometime in 2015, when his daughter was 19 or 20 years old, there was an attempt using a quitclaim deed to transfer the property from her back to Veiseh. Veiseh testified he prepared the quitclaim deed and caused it to be recorded. 

Veiseh’s lawsuit against the defendants was commenced in October 2011, and he alleged that defendant grazed cattle on land adjacent to the Parcel. The three causes of action in the second amended complaint were labeled (1) injury to farmland, (2) trespass, and (3) negligence. 

The trial court bifurcated the issue of Veiseh’s standing to assert the causes of action. In September 2016, the court held a three-day bench trial on that issue. At the close of the evidence on the bifurcated issue of standing, the court found Veiseh “was maintaining possession and control of the premises solely for his benefit and interest. Absolutely no interest in the custodian, absolutely no interest [or] benefit for the minor. The court ultimately concluded Veiseh “did not have an enforceable right of possession” and lacked standing to bring the claims. 

The trial court's decision relied heavily on the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act and concluded Veiseh “did not have lawful possession and control where the property was to be held, maintained, and used solely for the benefit of the minor. [Veiseh] was an interloper on the property.” Based on this determination, the decision concluded Veiseh lacked standing to assert the causes of action set forth in the second amended complaint. 

The question of who may sue for trespass to realty was addressed by the California Supreme Court over a century ago in the 1911 decision in Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane. It is a well-settled proposition that the proper party plaintiff in an action for trespass to real property is the person in actual possession. No averment of title in plaintiff is necessary. 

The Supreme Court further explained the role of title in a trespass action:  A defendant who is a mere stranger to the title will not be allowed to question the title of a plaintiff in possession of the land. It is only where the trespasser claims title himself, or claims under the real owner, that he is allowed to attack the title of the plaintiff whose peaceable possession he has disturbed. 

These statements from Lightner Mining remain an accurate description of California’s approach to the tort of trespass to realty. Prior peaceful possession is sufficient to maintain the action of ejectment against one who enters as a trespasser, and generally prior possession alone is sufficient as against a defendant who has no better right or title. 

Title to the land is significant to the outcome of a trespass action only when the alleged trespasser claims title himself or claims rights under the true owner. 

In Veiseh, defendants did not claim title to the Parcel and they did not claim the true owner of the property granted them to right to enter the Parcel. Therefore, the fact that Veiseh did not hold recorded title to the Parcel at the time of the alleged trespass does not bar his trespass claim. 

The cause of action for trespass affords protection for a possessory, not necessarily an ownership interest. For that reason, the plaintiff need not have legal rights in the land. Even one in peaceable though wrongful possession of real property may sue in tort for forcible interference with that possession even in the absence of injury to his person or goods. 

The term “lawful possession” includes peaceable possession, which can be established by proving actual possession—that is, subjecting the land to one’s will and control. It follows that “the plaintiff need not have legal rights in the land. 

During the trial, defendants argued that Veiseh’s possession of the Parcel was not lawful because he was in violation of the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. Under the act, property transferred to a custodian for the benefit of a minor is held and managed by the custodian for the use and benefit of the minor. 

The trial court addressed defendants’ argument by finding that, following the transfer of the Parcel pursuant to the grant deed, Veiseh “continued to maintain possession and control of the [Parcel] solely for his own benefit and interest, with absolutely no intent to benefit the minor, through her custodian.” 

The court determined Veiseh’s handling of the Parcel and the benefits derived from it was not consistent with the terms of the conveyance or the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. Based on the failure to comply with the legislation, the court concluded Veiseh had no right of lawful possession in the Parcel during the times relevant to the alleged trespass. 

Defendants’ argument and the trial court’s reliance on the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act to conclude Veiseh did not have lawful possession of the property presents a narrow issue of first impression. Defendants did not cite, and the Appellate Court did not locate, any authority for the principle that possession of real property is rendered unlawful for purposes of the tort of trespass when, contrary to the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, the property is not held for the use and benefit of the minor.  Veiseh’s failure to prove the Parcel was held for the benefit and use of his minor daughter did not render his possession unlawful. 

First, defendants’ reliance on Veiseh’s failure to comply with the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act is contrary to the general principle that a person with peaceable, actual possession of real property has standing to pursue a trespass action. Standing is not defeated by the fact the possessor has no legal rights to the property. 

Second, defendants did not refer to any statutory provision or legislative history supporting the inference that the Legislature adopted the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act for the purpose of protecting trespassers such as defendants or, more specifically, modifying the legal standards for standing to bring an action for trespass to realty. 

Third, the policy considerations underlying the lawful possession element of a trespass claim do not weigh in favor of holding that a failure to comply with the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act should bar a person in possession from seeking redress for a trespass. 

Having established the element of lawful possession, Veiseh had shown it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have reached a result more favorable to him absent the error. Consequently, the second phase of the bifurcated trial was necessary.

LESSONS:

1.         Title is important to determine who has standing to sue, but for the tort of trespass, "lawful possession" is sufficient.

2.         Even one in peaceable, though wrongful, possession of real property may sue in tort for forcible interference with that possession.

3.         Sometimes old decisions still state the rule: a defendant who is a mere stranger to the title will not be allowed to question the title of a plaintiff in possession of the land.