Friday, February 17, 2017

Listing Agreement Is Key To Collecting Commission


The recent case of Jacobs v. Locatelli outlines the importance of the listing agreement as a binding contract for a broker to recover a commission for the sale of real property, even if it was not executed by all of the owners.
The vacant land was owned by 6 owners, and Jacobs obtained an exclusive Vacant Land Listing Agreement for a list price of $2,200,000 that was only signed by Locatelli, with the other owners' signature lines left blank.  Jacobs alleged in her complaint that a written "agency agreement" exists between Locatelli and the other owners, Locatelli told her he was authorized to act on behalf of all of the owners, the other owners were aware of her retention as a broker, and two of the owners acknowledged her employment, were impressed by her performance, and inquired about working with her on other projects. These were important allegations, but not as valuable as obtaining all of the owners signature on the listing agreement to begin with.
Jacobs alleged that she spend significant time to market the property, and contacted a potential buyer named The Trust For Public Land (TPL), whose representative expressed interest in purchasing the property. However, when Jacobs informed Locatelli, of the interest from TPL, he was angry, asked for information regarding TPL, claimed he had been speaking with TPL for three years, and he wanted to change the exemption in the agreement from the Open Space Land Trust to TPL.
Subsequently, Locatelli informed Jacobs she was not to contact TPL, and that he would deal directly with TPL regarding the sale.  The owners of the land and TPL entered into an agreement for TPL to buy the property, but the sale was never consummated, apparently because issues arose between the owners and TPL.
Nevertheless, Jacobs filed a complaint against the owners for a $200,000 commission, alleging causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, anticipatory breach (implied repudiation), and specific performance.
The owners filed a demurrer, arguing that because all of the owners had not signed the listing agreement, the complaint was barred by the statute of frauds. Jacobs argued that Locatelli signed the agreement on behalf of the "joint venture" that consisted of all of the owners of the property.  The trial court sustained the demurrer, and after Jacobs filed an amended complaint, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to all owners who had not signed the listing agreement. 
In the listing agreement, "Owner" is defined as Locatelli, as trustee of his trust, "et al.", which the court of appeal ruled means "and others". Under the Statute of Frauds set forth in Civil Code, section 1624(a)(4), an agreement authorizing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate is invalid unless it is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent.  Any agency authority to enter into a contract required by law to be in writing must also be given by an instrument in writing under the equal dignities rule in Civil Code, section 2309.
In finding that the issue is whether Jacobs' allegation that Locatelli signed on behalf of the other owners who formed a joint venture is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, the court of appeal applied the pragmatic approach of the California Supreme Court in its decision in Sterling v. Taylor, which states the Statute of Frauds was not enacted to afford persons a means of evading just obligations, and if after consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the pertinent facts and all the evidence in a particular case the trial court concludes the enforcement of the agreement will not subject the defendant to fraudulent claims, the purpose of the Statute "will be best served by holding the note or memorandum sufficient even though it is ambiguous or incomplete."
As a result of Sterling, when ambiguous terms in a memorandum are disputed, extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve the uncertainty.  The agreement must still provide the essential terms that cannot be supplied by extrinsic evidence, but extrinsic evidence can be used to explain essential terms that were understood by the parties but would otherwise be unintelligible to others.  A cardinal rule of construction is when a contract is ambiguous or uncertain, the practical construction placed upon it by the parties before any controversy arises as to its meaning affords one of the most reliable means of determining the intent of the parties, and this rule governs the interpretation of a memorandum under the Statute of Frauds.
Therefore, the court of appeal reversed the trial court's decision, and allowed the case to proceed to enable Jacobs to introduce extrinsic evidence of the manner in which Locatelli signed the listing. The listing specified that there were multiple owners, and that could be interpreted as referring to all of the members of the joint venture that Jacobs claimed to exist.  Of course, it is doubtful that the defendants will provide any written confirmation of Locatelli's agency authority to sign for the other owners, and the uncertainty of a trial decision may encourage the parties to reach a settlement.
LESSONS: 
1.         The listing agreement is the contract that provides the broker a legal right to recover a commission, and extensive care should be given to its preparation and execution.
2.         The owners of real property should be determined by the broker in   preparing the listing agreement, and all owners' signatures should be obtained on the listing agreement.

3.         If the listing agreement is properly prepared and signed, the commission may be earned when a sale contract is entered into between the seller and buyer, even if the sale was never consummated with a closing of escrow.

Saturday, February 11, 2017

BFP's Purchase At Sheriff's Sale Prevents Restitution

In the recent case of Lee v. Rich, the California Court of Appeal recognized Code of Civil Procedure section 701.680 that provides that a Sheriff's execution sale (aka Trustee's Sale during a foreclosure proceeding), is "absolute and shall not be set aside for any reason", and ruled that because the purchaser of the real property at the Sheriff's sale was not the judgment creditor (i.e, lender, typically a bank) and was a bona fide purchaser ("BFP"), the debtor's remedies were limited to recovery of proceeds of the sale or equitable redemption.

Lee purchased his single family home in a common interest development (Homeowners Association-HOA), and ceased paying the HOA assessments.  The HOA dutifully sent Lee notices of delinquency, intent to record a lien, and recorded a lien on the property.  The HOA then filed a lawsuit against Lee that included foreclosure of the assessment lien.  Lee did not respond to the lawsuit, and after his default was entered, a judgment of foreclosure of the assessment lien was entered. 

Based on the default judgment, the HOA obtained a writ of sale, and a sheriff's deputy posted a notice of the sheriff's sale under foreclosure on Lee's front door that advised the property would be sold at auction to the highest bidder. 

Rich learned of the sheriff's sale, and the bidding opened for the amount of the HOA judgment, and overbids increased in $5,000 increments, until Rich made a bid of $210,000, and the property was sold to him for that amount.  Rich paid the required 10 percent deposit by cashier's check, and paid the balance at the end of the 3 month redemption period.  The property was subject to tax liens and other encumbrances that Rich paid.  Rich received a sheriff's deed to the property, and then filed an unlawful detainer action to evict Lee and obtained a default judgment.

Lee filed a motion to set aside and vacate the HOA's default judgment, arguing that he never received actual notice of the lawsuit because the summons was never mailed to his post office box address, but he did not serve Rich with the motion.  The Court granted Lee's motion to set aside and vacate the HOA's judgment and allowed him to file an answer.  Lee then filed a cross-complaint against the HOA, Rich, and the Orange County Sheriff for restitution of the amount of the judgment of $19,578.32.  Lee next filed a motion for restitution and to cancel the Sheriff's deed, which the court granted.

The Court of Appeal found that Rich was an indispensable party to the motion to set aside and vacate the default judgment because the potential effect of the motion would be to void Rich's title, and he was a party to the sale transaction.  Rich was a BFP at the Sheriff's sale, and the motion to vacate the default judgment impaired and impeded his ability to protect his interest in the property he purchased.

By statute, only the judgment debtor can set aside a Sheriff's sale for irregularity, and only where the purchaser was the judgment creditor.  Therefore, the sale to Rich, who was a BFP, could not be set aside, even if the underlying judgment was vacated.

The historical right of the debtor to exercise equitable redemption is only available where the judgment creditor purchases the property, and for a "grossly inadequate price", and where the purchaser is guilty of unfairness or has obtained an undue advantage.

This case is a good illustration of the steps involved in a Sheriff's sale following a judgment for an HOA against a debtor who fails to pay monthly assessments, and the limited ability of the debtor to recover the property after the sale.

The Lessons:

            1.  A debtor needs to enforce his/her rights before the Sheriff's or Trustee's Sale;

            2. A BFP is protected after purchasing the property at the sale; and

            3.  If the sale is to a BFP, The debtor is limited to recovery of proceeds of the sale or equitable redemption even if the underlying judgment is vacated.